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Abstract 
In bankruptcy problems we characterize the random arrival rule by means of CG-consistency and population 
monotonicity.
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     1. Introduction
The Talmud rule and the random arrival rule are two well-known rules
in bankruptcy problems. Having associated a game to every bankruptcy
problem, it is well known that the prenucleolus gives place to the Talmud
rule and the Shapley value to the random arrival rule (Aumann & Maschler,
1985; and O’Neill, 1982, respectively). In the axiomatic theory of TU games,
we have known that the max-reduced games and the self-reduced games are
imposed to characterize the prenucleolus and the Shapley value by Sobolev
(1975) and Hart & Mas-Colell (1989), respectively. Corresponding to the
max-reduced game, Aumann & Maschler (1985) introduced a deﬁnition of
a reduced problem in bankruptcy problems and used it to characterize the
Talmud rule. Hence, a natural problem raises whether there is an appropriate
deﬁnition of a reduced problem to characterize the random arrival rule. The
aim of this note is to answer this question.
As we have known, the fundamental deﬁnition of consistency applies only
if the reduction produces an admissible problem. A stronger version is ob-
tained by adding the requirement that this should indeed be the case. Albizuri,
Leroux and Zarzuelo (2008) introduced a deﬁnition of a reduced problem,
which corresponds to the self-reduced game, and used consistency to charac-
terize the random arrival rule in bankruptcy problems. The axiomatic result
in Albizuri, Leroux and Zarzuelo (2008) is true if we apply a stronger version
of consistency. However, if we apply the fundamental deﬁnition of consis-
tency, their proof is not completely correct because a reduced problem of
a bankruptcy problem may be not a bankruptcy problem. We propose an
example (see Example 1) to illustrate this fact. To overcome this drawback,
we add an axiom, population monotonicity, to a rule in order to make sure
the closedness under the reduction operation. Also, by CG-consistency and
population monotonicity, we characterize the random arrival rule.
2. Preliminaries and Example
Let U be the universe of agents. Let N ⊆ U, the cardinality of N is
denoted |N|. If x ∈ RN and S ⊆ N, write xS for the restriction of x to S. We
denote R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0}, and RN
+ = {x ∈ RN | xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N}.
Also, if a ∈ R we denote a+ = max{a,0}.
A triple (N,E,c) is called a bankruptcy problem, if N is a non-empty
ﬁnite set of U (the set of claimants), E ∈ R+ (the estate), and c ∈ RN
+ (the
1vector of claims) is such that
P
i∈N ci ≥ E. We will denote ci = min{E,ci}.
Let βU denote the set of all bankruptcy problems.
Let (N,E,c) ∈ βU. The feasible set X(N,E,c) is deﬁned to be





xi = E and xi ≤ ci for all i ∈ N}.
Clearly, if x ∈ X(N,E,c), xi ≤ ci for all i ∈ N.
A rule on βU is a function σ that assigns to each bankruptcy problem
(N,E,c) ∈ βU a vector σ(N,E,c) ∈ X(N,E,c).
Here we study the random arrival rule (O’Neill, 1982) in bankruptcy
problems. To deﬁne this rule, imagine claimants arriving one at a time, and
compensate them fully until money runs out. The resulting awards vector of
course depends on the order in which claimants arrive. To remove the un-
fairness associated with a particular order, take the arithmetic average over
all orders of arrival of the awards vector calculated in this way. For a formal
deﬁnition of the resulting rule, let ΠN be the class of permutations of N.


















We refer to the two-claimants version of the random arrival rule as the
contested garment rule as follows.
Contested garment rule, CG. For each (N,E,c) ∈ βU with |N| = 2 and
each i,j ∈ N, i 6= j,
CGi(N,E,c) = (E − cj)+ +
E − (E − ci)+ − (E − cj)+
2
=
E + ci − cj
2
Inspired by Hart & Mas-Colell (1989), Albizuri, Leroux and Zarzuelo
(2008) deﬁned a reduced problem in bankruptcy problems as follows.
Let σ be a rule, (N,E,c) ∈ βU, and S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. The reduced problem










i = ci −
P
k∈N\S
(σk(N,E,c) − σk(N \ {i},E − ci,cN\{i})) for all i ∈ S.
1For more details, see Albizuri, Leroux and Zarzuelo (2008).
2The following example illustrates that a reduced problem of a bankruptcy
problem may be not a bankruptcy problem.








It is easy to see that E{1,2},σ = 3, c
{1,2},σ
1 = 1, and c
{1,2},σ





2 < E{1,2},σ, ({1,2},E{1,2},σ,c{1,2},σ) = ({1,2},3,(1,1)) is not
a bankruptcy problem.
3. Axiomatization
In this section, we characterize the random arrival rule by CG-consistency
and population monotonicity. The two axioms are deﬁned as follows.
CG-consistency: For each (N,E,c) ∈ βU and each S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, if




Remark 1 As we stated in Introduction, CG-consistency applies only if the
reduction produces an admissible problem. A stronger version is obtained by












U, and σS(N,E,c) = CG(S,E
S,σ,c
S,σ).”
Population monotonicity(PMON): For each (N,E,c) ∈ βU and each
j ∈ N, σi(N,E,c) ≥ σi(N\{j},E − cj,cN\{j}) for each i ∈ N\{j}.
PMON says that if all the members of N agree that a claimant j will get
his claim (the maximum payment he can get), then all the members of N\{j}
should be worse oﬀ after the right of the claimant j has been recognized.2
2Many rules satisfy PMON, for example, the random arrival rule, the Talmud rule, the
proportional rule, and so on.
3Remark 2 Let σ be a rule, (N,E,c) ∈ βU, and S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. If the
reduced problem (S,ES,σ,cS,σ) with (1’) c
S,σ
i ≥ 0 for each i ∈ S and (2’) P
i∈S c
S,σ
i ≥ ES,σ, then the reduced problem (S,ES,σ,cS,σ) is a bankruptcy
problem. In particular, if |S| = 2, the previous conditions (1’) and (2’) can
be rewritten to the following conditions (1) and (2), respectively.




σi(N,E,c) − σi(N \ {j},E − ¯ cj,¯ cN\{j})

≥ 0, where j = S \ {i}. (2)
Therefore, if a rule satisﬁes PMON, by conditions (1) and (2), then a two-
claimant reduced problem of a bankruptcy problem is still a bankruptcy prob-
lem.
Theorem 1 The RA rule is the unique rule on βU satisfying CG-consistency
and PMON.
Proof. It only needs to verify a two-claimant reduced problem of a bank-
ruptcy problem is still a bankruptcy problem. Then the remaining proof
follows that of Theorem 2 (Albizuri, Leroux and Zarzuelo, 2008). Since the
RA rule satisﬁes PMON, by Remark 2, a two-claimant reduced problem is
still a bankruptcy problem. This completes the proof.
The following examples show that CG-consistency and PMON in Theo-
rem 1 are logically independent.
Example 2 Let M be a rule deﬁned on βU by for each (N,E,c) ∈ βU and
for each i ∈ N,








It is not diﬃcult to verify that the rule M does not satisfy PMON and there
exists a two-claimant reduced problem (with respect to M) of a bankruptcy
problem is not a bankruptcy problem.3 Next let σ be a rule deﬁned on βU by
3We consider a bankruptcy problem (N,E,c) with N = {1,2,3}, E = 6 and c =
(3,2,2). It is easy to see that M(N,E,c) = (3,1.5,1.5), M(N\{2},E − c2,cN\{2}) =







5. Since M3(N,E,c) =
1.5 < 8





5 < 3 = E{2,3},M, the
rule M is not PMON and the reduced problem ({2,3},E{2,3},M,c{2,3},M) / ∈ βU.
4for each (N,E,c) ∈ βU,
σ(N,E,c) =

RA(N,E,c) ,if (S,ES,M,cS,M) ∈ βU for all S ⊆ N with |S| = 2
M(N,E,c) ,otherwise.
Then σ satisﬁes CG-consistent but it violates PMON.
Example 3 The proportional rule4 satisﬁes PMON but it violates CG-consistent.
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